The Assad regime was eliminated on 8 December 2024, after an 11-day blitzkrieg offensive by the Syrian rebels which ended the 13-year war against Assad.
The main rebel advance, which had originated in the Turkey-supported rebel area in the Idlib region on 27 November, took Homs on 7 December, and continued towards Damascus.
In south Syria, the local rebels who had restarted their rebellion on 6 December, quickly consolidated control over all south Syria, and also advanced on Damascus.
Another rebel advance towards the Syrian capital occurred from the east, from the area around the US military base in Al-Tanf, starting on 6 December.
With all these axes of rebel advance converging on the capital, the Assad regime proved incapable of organizing a last-ditch defense in Damascus. On 8 December, all military forces of the regime announced their capitulation to the rebels, with Assad fleeing to Russia.
Meanwhile, Syrian Kurds and the SDF coalition led by them took over more former Assad-controlled territory in the Euphrates valley including Deir Ez Zor on 6 December. Assad forces and Iran’s unofficial military forces stationed in the city retreated without resistance. That same day, SDF also took Al Bukamal, cutting Iran’s corridor from Iraq into Syria. The US reportedly “encouraged and provided intelligence support to the Kurds for its operations to take control of Syrian territory in eastern Syria.”
Following the fall of Assad, the two main remaining questions in terms of political and territorial control in Syria were whether the diverse rebel factions would be able to organize a unified government without infighting, and what forms would take interactions between the new Syrian government, led by former rebels, and the Syrian Kurds.
A crucial consequence of the fall of Assad was the end of Russia’s and Iran’s geopolitical influence in Syria, and elimination of their Geopolitical Facilitator (see the Watch Framework), the Assad regime. With that, Activities by these two powers involving Military Support of, and Cooperation with, the Assad regime came to an end.
For Iran, this meant the end of its geopolitical corridor running from its own territory through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast, which the regime in Tehran had gained in the 2010s as the Obama administration wavered with indecision. In this sense, Assad’s fall was beneficial for all adversaries of Iran.
The greatest beneficiary in terms of opportunities for widening its geopolitical influence is Turkey, which has provided the greatest foreign support to the victorious rebels, and, in particular, those factions among them that played the most important role in defeating Assad. Whether the new Syria is going to be democratic or not, the Sunnis, who constitute the majority of Syrian population, are certain to gain proper share in the governance of the country at last, which opens promising venues for the development of Turkish influence in Syria that were closed when the country was led by the Alawi minority during the rule of the Assad family.
Efforts Categories: Syrian Rebels vs Assad Regime Military Force (north of Damascus), Syrian Rebels vs Assad Regime Military Force (south of Damascus), Syrian Rebels vs Assad Regime Military Force (east of Damascus), Iran and Assad Regime vs Syrian Kurds Military Force, Turkey’s Military, Diplomatic and Economic Support of the Syrian rebels, Russia’s Military and Diplomatic Support of the Assad Regime, Russia-Assad Regime Military Cooperation, Russia’s Military Force vs Syrian Rebels, Iran’s Military Support of the Assad Regime, Iran-Assad regime Military Cooperation, US Military and Covert Support of Syrian Kurds
Modern Great Game Watch 