The Wall Street Journal’s material from 9 March 2025 presented some of the statistics of China’s military pressure against Taiwan.
The number of days in a year when China’s military aircraft entered Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) increased annually since 2021, from 240 that year, to 268 in 2022, 271 in 2023, and 314 in 2024. The monthly numbers of Chinese sorties into the Taiwanese ADIZ were the greatest in August 2022 at 446, and July 2024 at 437.
August 2022 marked a clear point of practical adoption of a new policy by China. Prior to that month, the cases of Chinese military aircraft crossing “the median line—the informal boundary splitting the Taiwan Strait” were relatively rare. In August 2022, the Chinese crossed the median line 302 times. Since then, such crossings have been conducted by China systematically.
Another important shift in the Chinese approached occurred in 2023. Previously, “Chinese aircraft were heavily concentrated to Taiwan’s southwest.” In 2023, “their routes extended all around Taiwan’s main island, including the more-distant east side.”
Besides the aircraft, China also employs assets ranging “from warships, coast guard vessels and research ships to drones, fishing fleets and more—in ever-greater numbers and in new patterns.”
Efforts Category: China’s Military Pressure vs Taiwan
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