The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.
Issue 28 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of April 2025. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.
Objective 6: Disrupting Western influence in the Western Balkans
- The Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Zakharova criticized Serbia’s ties with the European Union on 3 April, calling the EU a “sinking ship,” and saying it was not worth joining it to sink together with it.
Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine
- In the Russo-Ukrainian War, in April 2025, the Russians continued to gradually advance at a number of sections of the frontline, particularly in the area of Kostyantynivka and other parts of Donbas, and made some advances in the north of the Sumy region.
Objective 11: Achieving decisive influence over Moldova
- On 2 April, Moldova stated that “Russian agents spent around 200 million euros ($217 million),” amounting to about 1% of Moldova’s GDP, on efforts to “buy votes at its presidential election and EU referendum last year.”
- On 17 April, the Russian foreign ministry accused the Moldovan government of “attempting to demolish the autonomous status” of Gagauzia, using “totalitarian methods” in the region, and “strangling” the Gagauz people.
Objective 12: Absorbing Belarus
- On 17 April, the Jamestown Foundation reported a “significant infrastructure development in Asipovichy, Belarus, where a storage site for Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) may have been established since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.” The upgrades included “construction and renovation of barracks, ammunition storage facilities, and specialized hangars intended for Iskander-M operational tactical missile systems.”
Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa
- On 3 April, Russia hosted a joint meeting with the Confederation of Sahel States (Moscow’s satellite regimes in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), expressing support for the “dynamic development of the integration processes within the Confederation.” Russian foreign minister Lavrov stated that Russia saw the establishment of the Confederation of Sahel States as a “new architecture of regional security,” while Moscow pledged to “provide arms and military training to a newly formed joint force between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.”
Objective 18: Gaining strategic presence on the waterways connecting the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean basins
- In April, Russian sources reported that Moscow was supplying the Sudanese ruling regime’s military with spare parts for airplanes.
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