Covert and Political Subversion vs Britain
Serving Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states
15 Jun 2026. A BBC investigation identifies a young Russian diplomat, Evgeny Lyukshin, trained in information warfare at MGIMO under Kremlin-connected spies and Rybar operatives, as the likely handler behind arson attacks on UK Prime Minister Starmer’s properties, as well as a fake far-right group called Direct Action used to stir societal division in the UK.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8r2l352z2do
Political Subversion in Germany
Serving Objective 2: Strengthening the Western political forces considered by Moscow to be inimical to the Western-led international order, and the Kremlin’s relationships with such forces
16 May 2026. Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev publicly praises the AfD as the “hope for Germans”, citing the party’s 36% poll lead in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ahead of September state elections in Berlin, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Saxony. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/putin-confidant-calls-far-afd-142324858.html
Political and Diplomatic Subversion vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serving Objective 7: Achieving instability in the Western Balkans
5 Jun 2026. At a meeting with Republika Srpska political leader Dodik in Saint Petersburg, Lavrov claims a systematic assault on the Dayton Accords is underway by the Bosnian authorities and the West, calls this “extremely dangerous.”
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2115224/
Political Subversion against Armenia
Serving Objective 28: Achieving decisive influence over Armenia
7 Jun 2026. International election monitors allege Russia exercised “unprecedented pressure” on Armenia’s parliamentary election using public threats and trade measures, with the head of the European Parliament observer delegation condemning what she called “blatant interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.”
https://www.reuters.com/world/armenias-ruling-party-leads-parliamentary-vote-with-57-early-results-2026-06-07/
5 Jun 2026. The New York Times reports that Kremlin-linked groups including the Social Design Agency are flooding Armenian social media with disinformation ahead of the 7 June parliamentary election, spreading fabricated narratives against Pashinyan across platforms via bot networks, fake news sites, and doctored celebrity videos, in “an unusually intense barrage of overt and covert influence operations.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/05/world/europe/armenia-election-russia-disinformation.html
29 May 2026. Reuters reports that Russia is running covert influence operations ahead of Armenia’s 7 June election including a scheme to transport Russia-based Armenians to vote against Pashinyan. Russia’s Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency also drafted plans for a diaspora media outlet and disinformation campaigns, while the Storm-1516 bot network is running online operations to discredit the Pashinyan government.
https://www.reuters.com/world/imported-voters-fake-websites-russias-covert-efforts-stop-armenias-pivot-west-2026-05-29/
19 May 2026. The Insider reports that Russia is deploying FSB, GRU, and SVR officers under diplomatic cover in Yerevan to subvert Armenia’s 7 June parliamentary elections, with the Kremlin coordinating the operation through a newly created presidential directorate, and backing pro-Russian opposition candidates — including one with an FSB notation in his passport records and another convicted of rape — to prevent Pashinyan’s party from winning. https://theins.ru/inv/292503
15 May 2026. Stratfor reports that the pro-Kremlin Matryoshka bot network is publishing hundreds of fake videos targeting Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan ahead of the 7 June parliamentary election, while a leaked Russian document titled “Programme for Work in the ‘Anti-Pashinyan’ Direction for 2026” describes efforts to frame the vote as a personal confidence referendum on Pashinyan, expand Russia-aligned narratives, and increase the number of Russia-aligned opinion makers in Armenia. https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/armenia-russia-kremlin-influence-campaign-targets-pashinyan-ahead-vote
Economic Subversion against Armenia
Serving Objective 28: Achieving decisive influence over Armenia
28 May 2026. Russia bans Armenian tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, leafy vegetables, and strawberries, following earlier bans that week on Armenian flowers, mineral water, and brandy, as Moscow escalates economic pressure on Armenia ahead of its 7 June parliamentary election.
https://www.reuters.com/business/russia-ratchets-up-pressure-armenia-ahead-june-election-2026-05-28/
Diplomatic Pressure on Armenia
Serving Objective 28: Achieving decisive influence over Armenia
27 May 2026. Russia formally warns Armenia it will suspend or terminate the supply of cheap oil, gas, and rough diamonds if Yerevan continues its EU accession process, with Russian Energy Minister Tsivilev’s letter describing Armenia’s EU tilt as incompatible with the bilateral partnership.
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-warns-armenia-it-could-end-cheap-fuel-supplies-if-yerevan-continues-eu-2026-05-27/
12 May 2026. Russian State Duma Speaker Volodin draws a menacing parallel between Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan’s recent steps — including inviting Zelensky to a summit in Yerevan — and how things “began in Ukraine,” warning that Russia-Armenia relations will grow more tense as a result. https://www.pnp.ru/politics/volodin-provel-parallel-mezhdu-politikoy-armenii-i-tem-kak-vse-nachinalos-na-ukraine.html
Diplomatic Support of the Regime in Cuba
Serving Objective 8: Undermining US Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere
10 Jun 2026. Russia’s Foreign Ministry declares full solidarity with the Cuban government, condemning US “intimidation” and unilateral restrictive measures against Cuba, and describes the American blockade as a method of the US administration to establish control over the island in line with attempts to revive the “Monroe Doctrine.”
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2116586/#31
15 May 2026. Lavrov meets Cuban Foreign Minister Rodriguez Parrilla, confirms Russia’s readiness to provide Cuba with “politico-diplomatic and material support” amid US pressure, while backing Havana’s demand for an immediate end to the US trade and financial blockade.
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2109281/
Russian Military Influence in Guinea
Serving Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa
6 Jun 2026. Russian sources report that the port of Conakry in Guinea is being used as a transit route for weapons and equipment flowing to Russia’s African Corps in Mali.
https://rybar.ru/piwigo/upload/2026/06/06/20260606100757-90fefce5.jpg
Military Force in Mali
Serving Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa
2 Jul 2026. Russian sources report active operations by Russian troops, together with the Malian regime forces, against the rebels in “over a dozen areas” of Mali.
https://t.me/rybar/81466
Serving Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa
Aid Support of Somalia
15 May 2026. Russia delivers 25 tons of humanitarian aid to Somalia — including grain, sunflower oil, canned meat and other products — at an official ceremony in Mogadishu airport.
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2109758/
Covert Presence in Cuba
Serving Objective 17: Entrenching Russian influence in the Western hemisphere
22 May 2026. The Wall Street Journal reports that Russia operates two signals intelligence facilities in Cuba targeting US military headquarters in Florida, with intelligence personnel numbers roughly tripling since 2023.
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-warns-of-growing-russian-and-chinese-spying-in-cuba-a99059dd
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